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Abstract
Machine learning practitioners are often ambiva-
lent about the ethical aspects of their products.
We believe anything that gets us from that cur-
rent state to one in which our systems are achiev-
ing some degree of fairness is an improvement
that should be welcomed. This is true even when
that progress does not get us 100% of the way to
the goal of “complete” fairness or perfectly align
with our personal belief on which measure of fair-
ness is used. Some measure of fairness being built
would still put us in a better position than the sta-
tus quo. Impediments to getting fairness and ethi-
cal concerns applied in real applications, whether
they are abstruse philosophical debates or techni-
cal overhead such as the introduction of ever more
hyper-parameters, should be avoided. In this pa-
per we further elaborate on our argument for this
viewpoint and its importance.
1. Introduction
General questions regarding the fairness of machine learn-
ing models have increased in their frequency and study in
recent years. Such questions can quickly enter philosophi-
cal domains and subjective world views (Binns, 2018), but
are crucial as machine learning becomes integrated in the
fabric of society. The attention and critical thought is well
deserved as we see applications emerge which can dramat-
ically impact people’s lives and families, such as predic-
tive policing (Ensign et al., 2018) and sentencing (Choulde-
chova, 2017; Barabas et al., 2018).
Despite this, we argue that a significant potion of the ma-
chine learning community are missing important questions
regarding how to maximize the amount of fair machine
learning deployed in the world. In particular, there are prac-
tical considerations for applied fairness with respect to cur-
rent fairness that are being ignored. Stated simply if we
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want to increase fairness of real world machine learning sys-
tems, we should not delay solutions over concerns of opti-
mal fairness when there currently exists no fairness at all.
As such we must ask: how do we maximize the number of
people implementing/deploying fair/ethical machine learn-
ing solutions? We posit that the answer to such a question is
to minimize the amount of mental and computational work
that must be done to gain fairness. This applies to any prac-
titioner with varying degrees of education and/or training
in ethics and machine learning. If the incremental cost to
deployment is too significant, we argue the concern of fair-
ness will often be dropped in the name of expediency and
financial cost.
Under this general belief, we have identified three areas
where we feel the community could increase social good
by instead tempering its advance on some optimal notion of
fairness. These areas relate to the debate around what ideal
of fairness should be used (mental cost), over-reliance on
trolley car hypotheticals (mental cost), and the nature of the
algorithms people are developing (computational cost).
2. The Unfair Criticism for the Wrong
Fairness
One of the largest impediments to stopping the adoption of
fairness by non-expert practitioners is answering “what is
fairness?” There is a rich history of philosophical debate
around this very question from which we can build upon as a
community (Binns, 2018). At the same time, a philosophical
conclusion has not been reached after hundreds of years
— so we arguably should not expect there to be one true
definition. If people can not agree on a single definition of
“fair” when defining it with natural language, why would we
expect a single definition to be found when we move into
the more rigorous, less ambiguous language of mathematics
and algorithms? Furthermore, the definition of “fair” may
change over time as societal views change, unlike technical
definitions we are used to working with. There may in fact
be no one, final, universal definition of “fair” to be found.
Indeed many differing definitions and metrics for fairness
and discrimination in predictive machine learning have been
developed (Romei & Ruggieri, 2014; Kamiran & Calders,
2009; Hardt et al., 2016) and shown to be at some level in-
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compatible with each other (Hardt et al., 2016). This is fo-
cused on primarily binary prediction problems in ML; let
alone nascent definitions in sub-areas like recommender
systems (Burke et al., 2018; Ekstrand et al., 2018), regres-
sion (Calders et al., 2013; Berk et al., 2017), and cluster-
ing (Chierichetti et al., 2017) or those that may have been de-
fined in neighboring fields like economics (Baumol, 1982).
Given these competing definitions of fairness, it is important
that we as a community avoid being overly critical on what
specific definition of fairness is selected for an individual
project or system. For those applications where no measures
of fairness are currently considered, we should even go
further and applaud and encourage the selection of any
reasonable fairness criteria, even if it is not the one we
would have personally preferred.
Doing so immediately increases the amount of fairness, by
some metric, in the deployed world — which we argue is
intrinsically of greater social good than leaving the question
of fairness wholly unaddressed. The implementers of the
system, by selecting any measure, are now invested in the
fairness of their product and thus may become more open to
improving the fairness as a type of feature. Even if another
measure is objectively superior given some context, having
a less-ideal metric implemented opens the door for revisiting
and adjusting the fairness portion of the system at another
point in time.
In addition, a machine learning system of suboptimal fair-
ness may still be more fair than the non-quantitative, human
system it augments or replaces. An only-partially fair quan-
titative system may be preferred because it can be measured,
logged and inspected in a way that no human-driven, qual-
itative decision making can be. This greater legibility can
lead to greater transparency.
Encouraging this could prove to be an advantageous path of
least resistance. Not only does it allow for a transitional na-
ture, but can yield positive network effects within larger or-
ganizations. For example, Team A gets to add a monthly up-
date report that fairness as added as a feature, which could
get other mangers or engineers thinking about fairness for
their project. This may not happen if members of the team
fear being censured for choosing the “wrong” metric of fair-
ness, or for implementing a system which increases fairness
without completely maximizing it on some measure.
An important component of this success is respectful dis-
course between groups on disagreements about what is or is
not fair, and openness about how one is measuring fairness
in a given system. If these do not exist, disagreements may
devolve to stronger accusations and acrimony.
Johndrow & Lum (2017) highlighted an example of this
with the maligned COMPAS system for predicting criminal
recidivism. Angwin et al. (2016) from ProPublica published
an article about bias in the COMPAS system. In response,
the company which developed COMPAS, Northpointe, re-
leased a report showing the metrics by which their system
was fair (Dieterich et al., 2016). Clearly the issue under con-
sideration is of critical importance, to a degree such that the
debate about what the best measure of fairness is and how to
make the system more fair as a whole should be mandatory
and continuous. But the nature of how this debate has un-
folded (in this particular instance) has lead to considerable
negative publicity when it appears that Nortpointe made an
earnest good faith effort to address the issue before it be-
came newsworthy. The issue appears not to be fair-vs-unfair,
but which of two competing and somewhat incompatible
definitions of fairness should be prioritized.
As a community we must avoid exchanges like COMPAS to
avoid scaring off future leaders and decision makes from
the issue of fairness (and machine learning more broadly).
Put simply, COMPAS sets a precedent for social risk via
negative publicity even when attempting to imbue machine
learning systems with fairness. Even if one were to go well
beyond what Northpointe did, there is still a risk of censure
from critiques simply because they may adopt a different
definition of fairness. This risk may prevent adoption, and
thus lower the total fairness within the world.
If we instead accept that there is no single supreme defini-
tion of fairness, the situation can be improved. When we ac-
cept that others may not have considered certain factors in
selecting their fairness measure, or may have reached their
conclusion under different but equally valid philosophical
beliefs, the conversation about fairness can be lifted to a
more civil and less accusatory tone. In doing so the social
risk can be transformed into social reward, as feedback will
no longer be perceived as an attack that must be defended —
but as genuine interest from the larger community.
3. Should Autonomous Vehicles Brake for the
Trolley Car?
The trolley car problem (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976) has
been the subject of much debate recently, coinciding with
the increased interest in both fairness and autonomous ve-
hicles. While many variants exist, the general trolley car
problem is as follows: if a vehicle continues on it’s current
path, it will kill five people in its way; if some action is
taken it can instead strike and kill only a single person. The
specifics of the dilemma change (if the vehicle continues
driving it will hit a child; if it swerves it will kill its passen-
ger), but at its core it is a contrived situation with a set of
exclusively bad outcomes.
With self-driving cars on the precipice of deployment, the
trolley car problem makes intuitive sense for study. Hard-
ware failures, sudden changes in environment (like an earth-
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quake), or actions of bystanders/non-autonomous vehicles
are all factors outside of a self-driving agent’s control that
could lead to a potentially fatal situation. All of this is made
more pertinent due to the first, unfortunate, death at the hand
of an autonomous vehicle (Lee, 2018).
Even before this sad death, many have been debating the
trolley car problem and arguing that a solution is needed for
deployment (Achenbach, 2015; Corfield, 2017; Lin, 2016;
Goodall, 2016). This circles back to the problems we dis-
cussed in section 2 on what measure of ethical behavior we
should be using to decide who lives and who dies in the
myriad of possible trolley car scenarios? Surveys reveal that
people prefer that cars be willing to sacrifice the driver, but
simultaneously would not personally want to own such a
car (Bonnefon et al., 2016). That this would create an di-
chotomy is understandable, but it makes reaching a consen-
sus on what should be done difficult. Further studies have
looked at presenting varied trolley car scenarios and simply
asking people which way the car should swerve, and then
attempting to quantify the resulting empirical ethos (Shariff
et al., 2017).
Despite all of these questions of research and debate, we
do not see it asked: do drivers today consider the trolley
car problem when they are about to enter an accident? We
argue that no such consideration exists today or even could
with human drivers. The small amount of time to react in
any such scenario likely means people are simply relying
on gut reactions and are not performing any meaningful
consideration of who will and will not survive an accident.
Nor do we prepare people to make these sorts of decisions:
no ethical training or testing is undertaken before issuing
people with drivers’ licenses.
If people are not considering this problem today, why should
we require self driving cars to do the same? It results in a
moving of goal posts, requiring cars to reach super-human
abilities before we let them take over a task.1 If self driving
cars can reduce the number of fatalities by 90% (Bertoncello
& Wee, 2015), then we reduce the incident rate of trolley
car situations by 90%. In this way we are in a sense solving
the trolley car problem by reducing its frequency, as the best
possible scenario is the one where the trolley car problem
never occurs. We argue this increases social good without
having to solve such a difficult problem, and that delaying
deployment until such a satisfactory solution is obtained
may in-fact needlessly delay improved safety for everyone.
We take a moment to emphasize that we are not arguing
1Some argue that AI should only have to be as ethical as the
humans whose decisions they are supplanting. Other claim that
since AI may have super-human abilities, it is not unreasonable
that they have super-human ethical responsibilities. We would
contend that holding AI to a higher standard than humans may be
acceptable, but holding them to a standard of perfection is not.
self driving cars should be deployed as soon as possible.
Considerable and thorough safety and validation testing
should be mandatory before public deployment; corners can
not afford to be cut. We are arguing that certain fairness
considerations that are being debated, such as the trolley car
problem, have been imbued with an importance beyond the
reality of their application.
Along these lines, we need to further consider what situa-
tions will lead to trolley car problems. It seems likely that
one of the most likely culprits is mechanical failures: breaks
stop working effectively, steering or sensor systems may
malfunction, etc. In such a case, even if the car had an ora-
cle that solved the trolley car problem, it is not obvious to
us that it would be able to execute on that solution due to
the aforementioned mechanical failure.
Going further, even if we did have a oracle that can solve
the trolley car problem, we likely could not effectively use
it. This is because the car itself will need to be predicting
people, their ages, the risk of fatality, an a myriad of other
factors that would be necessary inputs to the trolley car
problem. But each of these predictions will have their own
error rates, and some, like risk of fatality, may not even have
any reliable models developed. Realistically any trolley car
solution would also require an understanding of risk and
uncertainty about the situation itself. This is an issue we
don’t see discussed, and is contributes to why we feel a
trolley car solution is an unreasonable expectation.
To delay a potential life-saving innovation is itself deadly.
We are engaging in a real-life meta-trolley problem: our
meta-trolley is currently running on a track that allows hu-
man drivers to kill a million people a year (World Health
Organization, 2015), and could be switched to an alternate
track that may be far less deadly. Meanwhile we stand by
arguing about the propriety of pulling the lever to allow the
meta-trolley to switch tracks.
4. Fairly Complicated Fair Algorithms
We’ve discussed two situations in which the emphasis on
getting fairness exactly right may lead to reduced fairness
in practice. Now we discuss a matter with regard to practi-
tioners in making fairness algorithms as usable as possible.
This means reducing the number of hyper parameters, and
computational and cognitive costs in adding fairness to cur-
rent algorithms, an issue we feel is under studied.
A common issue is the introduction of multiple new hyper
parameters to an algorithm, in addition to the ones that ex-
isted before (Zemel et al., 2013; Louizos et al., 2016; Ed-
wards & Storkey, 2016). This can get particularly out of
hand when multiple different parts of the model must be
specified for any new problem (Johndrow & Lum, 2017).
Such solutions necessitate a more expensive parameter
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search, thus increasing the financial cost of developing de-
ployable solutions. This reduces the incentive for companies
to invest in the time to make fair models, and thus should
be something we try to minimize.
While we have no expectation of a magic black box which
will produce fair algorithms and require no work, we do
believe there is room for considerable simplification of the
approaches being developed. Having one or zero hyper
parameters may not lead to a perfectly optimized balance
between fairness and predictive performance, but it may
lead to faster adoption and integration within organizations
today, thus increasing fairness from our current baseline.
In a similar vein, we would like to see research along au-
tomatically selecting a measure of fairness to optimize for
and providing human readable reports about what the ram-
ifications would be. As far as the authors are aware, these
two notions have yet to receive study in the machine learn-
ing community. The automatic selection of a fairness metric
could be done with respect to a maximum acceptable loss
in accuracy (e.g., which measure can be maximally satisfied
at a fixed cost?). Though the solution may not be optimal, it
could prove better than the default state of no fairness con-
sideration.
A tool that can generate human readable reports on the im-
pacts of different fairnesses measures and provide some
“map” of the potential options would also provide value. It
better enables product developers and practitioners who are
not experts to weigh the costs of fairness and potentially in-
tegrate them, as well as the impacts of any measure selected
in the aforementioned auto-fairness idea.
The goal of all of these preferences for usable fair algo-
rithms is not to directly solve fairness by any means; but to
maximize social good in the near and long term. They cre-
ate a path of least resistance for novices who are concerned
about fairness so that something can be integrated immedi-
ately. This also opens the door to future exploration and im-
provement of fairness as its own feature, and provides, in
our opinion, a viable method for integration into the max-
imal number of systems. If such work continues to be un-
studied, we may leave businesses and developers a daunting
task: a whole world of literature, competing definitions, and
philosophical questions fraught with ethical and social com-
plexities that must be understood before even being able to
start. The apparent gap itself may become the biggest deter-
rent to adoption, and so we wish to implore the community
to build these bridges.
5. Conclusions
Our current machine learning systems are becoming more
powerful and being deployed more widely each day, and yet
they — and their creators — are often completely oblivious
to issues of fairness. There is a broad chasm between the
current state of machine learning and ideally ethical systems.
It is our contention that we should welcome any efforts
which narrow that gap, even if they fall short of bridging it
completely.
We believe that some fairness is better than no fairness.
Arguments, attitudes and techniques for perfect fairness are
retarding out ability to get any improvements relative to the
status quo. We should not let the perfect be the enemy of
the good.
We call on people in this discussion to realize that other
researchers and practitioners are trying to make the world
better and more just, even if they aren’t making the exact
improvement that you might prefer. We do not mean that
anyone should be beyond reproach, merely that we should
aim to make critiques constructively and civilly so that we
can work together toward a more fair society.
We propose that researchers and practitioners in this field
should not ask “does this meet some Platonic ideal of fair-
ness?” but rather they should be concerned with “does this
increase the amount of fairness in the world?”
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